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THE RIGHT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS TO PUNISH OFFENDERS AGAINST THE BALLOT BOX.
I.

The propositions advanced in this article may be broadly
laid down as follows The Federal Courts have jurisdiction to punish crimes against
the ballot box, at Congressional elections: Exparte Siebold
(1879), ioo U. S. 371; Eaxparte Yarbrough (1883), IIo Id.
653.
This rule bbtains, even though the offenders had no intention of falsifying the returns, as to the Congressional vote, and
did not interfere with them. The reason of this doctrine is,
that the entire vote, both for State officers and for Congressmen, must be considered as an unit; hence, an interference
with the returns of the State vote, violates the laws of Congress, and the offenders are criminally liable under the statutes
of the United States: In re Coy (i888), 127 U. S. 731 ; In re
Coy (1887), U. S. Circ. Ct., Dist. Indiana, 31 Fed. Repr. 794Over other elections, the Federal Courts have no jurisdiction
to punish violators of the election laws, except when there is
a discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, within the prohibitions of the Fifteenth
Amendment: U. S. v. Reese, et al. (1875), 92 U. S. 214.
[Since the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States, in Fitzgerald v. Green (March 24, 189o), there is doubt
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as to the elections where State officers and Presidential electors, or Presidential electors alone, but no Representatives in
Congress, are balloted for: infra,page 344.
II.

The first Article of the Constitution of the United States
providesSEcriON 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and
Electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for Electors of
the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the
Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such
vacancies.

[It would be neither necessary nor profitable to quote the
opinions of different writers upon the qualifications of the voters or electors for Representatives, as this is a legal and not
a political essay and is intended rather to be an exposition of
the various decisions of the Federal courts. Still, a reference
to a well-known work will be proper, in view of the authority
conceded to it by Chief Justice MARSHALL, especially in Colzens
v. Vrginia (1821), 6 Wheat. (i 9 U. S.) 264, 419.,
The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican government. It was incumbent upon the
Convention, therefore, to define and establish this right in the Constitution.
Tohave left it open for the occasional regulation of the Congress, would
have been improper, for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted
it to the legislative discretion of the States, would have been improper for
the same reason ; and for the additional reason, that it would have rendered
too dependent on the State governments, that branch of the Federal
government which ought to be dependent upon the people alone. To
have reduced the different qualifications in the different States, to one
uniform rule, would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the
States, as it would have been difficult to the Convention. The provision
made by the convention appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within
their option. It must be satisfactory to every State; because it is conformable to the standard already established, or which may be established
by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States; because, being
fixed by the State Constitutions, it is not alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of the States will alter this
part of their Constitutions, in such a manner as to abridge the rights
secured to them by the Federal Constitution: The Federalist, No. 52.
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While this Second section of the First Article of the Constitution adopts the qualifications prescribed by the States for
a voter at an election for the popular branch of the State legislature, yet Congre~s has a supervisory power over the subject,
under the provisions of the Fourth section of the same Article
of the Constitution (infra), in order to secure legal and fair
elections, a free and safe exercise of the right to vote thereat,
and to prevent fraud and violence thereabout. Congress can
make altogether new regulations or add to or alter those already made by the State; impose new duties on the State officers of election and provide for the appointment of other
officers; and compel the enforcement of State and Federal laws
regulating elections. A regulation made by Congress is of
superior authority, and any State law repugnant to it is void
as to Congressional elections. Congress has plenary and
paramount jurisdiction over these elections: ln re Coy (1888),
127 U. S. 731.
The provision in relation to vacancies in the Representation from any State is enforced by the Revised StatutesSEc. 26. The time for holding elections in any State, District or Territory for a Representative or Delegate to finl a vacancy, whether such
vacancy is caused by a failure to elect at the time prescribed by law, or
by the death, resignation, or incapacity of a person elected, may be prescribed by the laws of the several States and Territories respectively.
[Under these provisions of the Constitution*and the Revised Statutes, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island were of
opinion that a vacancy caused by the House unseating a
member was one to be filled at an election ordered by the
Governor; but if the count of the votes established no election, then under a law of Rhode Island the legislature might
order a new election, and the Governor, even if he had power
under the Constitution of the United States, might wait for the
action of the General Assembly so long as it was in session:
In re Representative Vacancy (1887), 15 R. I. 621 ; In re CongressionalElections (1887), Id. 624, 627.
[The First article of the Constitution also provides-,
SEcTiox 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six
years.

*

*

*
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SCTION 4. The times, places and manner of holding elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter
such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.

[Hamilton, in The Federalist (Nos. 59, 60, 61) explains this
section, together with the objections which were originally
raised against it, by proceeding on the broad ground that
every government ought to contain in itself, the means of its
own preservation. This principle was yielded in the case of the
Senate, chiefly because the autonomy of the States would be
endangered; moreover the Senate is a body whose members
are classified in terms, whilst the Representatives are to be
elected every two years. The present arrangement, Hamilton
thought preferable in that it would be more convenient and satisfactory in ordinary cases and when no improper views prevail;
so that the intention was to have Federal interference upon extraordinary circumstances, when safety demanded.
[Under this section of the Constitution, Congress enactedCHAP. XLVII. Aiz Act for the appointmentof Refresentatives among"
the several States according to the Sixth Census. (Approved June 25,
1842, 5 Stat. at Large 491.)
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That in every case where a State is
entitledto more than one Representative, the number to which each State
shall be entitled under this apportionment shall be elected by districts
composed of contiguous territory., equal in number to the number of
Representatives -to which said State may be entitled, noone district electing more than one Representative.

[Justice MILLER, in the Yarbrough case (szara) explains
the origin and purpose of this section:It was not until 1842, that Congress took any action under the power
here conferred, when, conceiving that the system of electing all the
members of the House of Representatives from a State by a general ticket,
as it was called, that is, every elector voting for as many names as the
State was entitled to representatives in that House, worked injustice to
other States which did not adopt that system, and gave an undue preponderance of power to the political party which had a majority of votes in
the States, however small, enacted that each member should be elected
by a separate district, composed of contiguous territory: (Iio U. S. 66o.)

[Thirty years later, the language of the Act of 1842 was
slightly changed, but the sense remained the same, and, in the
language of the Act of February 2, 1872 (Section 2, 17 Stat.
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at Large 28, as amended by the Act of May 30, 1872, Id. 192)
now appears in the Revised Statutes of the United States asSEC. 23. In each State entitled under this apportionment to more than
one Representative, the number to which such State may be entitled in the
Forty-third and each subsequent Congress shall be elected by districts
composed of contiguous territory, and containing as nearly as practicable
an equal number of inhabitants, and equal in number to the number of
Representatives to which such State may be entitled in Congress, no one
district electing more than one Representative; but in the election of Representatives to the Forty-third Congress in any State to which an increased
number of Representatives is given by this appointment, the additional
Representative or Represenatives, may be elected by the State at large, and
the other Representatives by the districts as now prescribed by law, unless
the Legislature of the State shall otherwise provide before the time fixed
by law for the election of Representatives therein.

[Hamilton discussed the power to pass this statute, in The
Federalist (Nos. 6o and 61), where he was called upon to meet
the objection that the Constitution did not compel the voters
to meet in no larger divisions than one county or similar division of the State. The evils of a general ticket were not
then apparent.
[Justice MILLER, in the same Yarbrough case (supra),
points out that the election of Representatives in the different
States on different days finally appeared to be an evil which
Congress remedied by another section of the same Act of
February 2, '1872, which is now incorporated into the Revised
Statutes asSEc. 25. The Tuesday next after the first Monday in November, in the
year eighteen hundred and seventy-six, is established as the day, in each
of the States and Territories of the United States, for the election of Representatives and Delegates to the Forty-fifth Congress; and the Tuesday
next after the first Monday in November, in every second year thereafter,
is established as the day for the election, in each of said States and
Territories, of Representatives and Delegates to the Congress commencing
on the fourth day of March next thereafter.

[Commenting upon the appointment of a time for the election of Representatives, Justice MILLER, in the same case, remarkedNow the day fixed for electing members of Congress has been established by Congress without regard to the time set for election of State officers,
in each State, and but for the fact that the State legislatures have, for their
own accommodation, required State elections to be held at the same
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time, these elections would be held for Congressmen alone at the time
fixed by the act of Congress: iio U. S. 661.

[These last words receive peculiar force from the Act of
March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. at Large 4o0, in vhich occurs this concession to convenience:SEc. 6. That section twenty-five of the Revised Statutes prescribing
the time for holding elections for Representatives to Congress, is hereby
modified so as not to apply to any State that has not yet changed its day
of election, and whose Constitution must be amended in order to effect a
change in the day of election of State officers in said State.

[To prevent viva voce voting and to make an uniform system of ballots, an amendatory Act to that of May 31, 1870
(16 Stat. at Large 14o, "to enforce the right of citizens of the
United States to vote"), provided, as now incorporated in the
Revised StatutesSEc. 27. All votes for Representatives in Congress must be by written
or printed ballot; and all votes received or recorded contrary to this
Section shall be of no effect. (Act of February 28, 1871, Sect. 19, 16
Stat. at Large 44o.)

[The first article of the Constitution also providesSEcTION 5- Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns,
and Qualifications of its own Members.
SEcTION 8. The Congress shall have powerTo make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

[The following remarks by WOODRUFF, J. (. S. v. Quinn
(1870), U. S. Circ. Ct., S. Dist. N. Y., 8 Blatchf. 48, 6 4-5), are
of interest in the absence of decisions upon the point:We do not think it necessary to rest our views of the constitutionality of
the law [section 5512, Rev. Stat. U. S.] upon that [fifth] section, and yet
the agreement, to our minds, is plausible in a high degree, if indeed, we
ought not to regard it as satisfactory considered alone, namely, that when
the Constitution confers upon each house the power to judge of the election returns, and qualifications of its own members and then authorizes
Congress to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers, and all other powersvested in anydepartmentofthe
Government, it authorizes Congress to make such laws touching the co W
1duct of elections and returns, as will operate, first, to furnish to each
House of Congress appropriate evidence of the validity of the commission,
or appointment of any man who comes there, claiming the right to a seat,
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and, second, to prohibit the intervention of any obstacle which might embarrass, or prevent, the exercise of the right of each House to judge the
election of any man who claims the right to a seat.

[As a result of the great struggle between the North and
the South, the Fourteenth Amendment (ratified in 1868 and
proclaimed July 28, 1868) provides:SECTION i. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States ; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
SECTION 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.

And two years later, the Fifteenth Amendment (ratified in
187o and proclaimed March 30, 187o) added that:SECTroN i. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
Ei.

The second Article of the Constitution provides (Section
one), in relation to the President and Vice-President of the
United States thatEach State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a number of Electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress. * *
The Congress may determine the time of choosing the Electors, and
the day on which they shall give their votes ; which day shall be the same
throughout the United States.

[Under this Section, Congress has exercised its constitutional powers in Chapter one, Title Three, of the Revised
Statutes, as amended by Act of February 3, 1887 (24 Stat. at
Large, page 373), and Act of October I9, 1888 (25 Stat. at
Large, page 613)- It is, however, unnecessary to consider these
sections in this place, as the recent decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States, in Fitzgeraldv. Green, read March
24, 189o, by Justice GRAY, has declared that electors for President and Vice-President, although appointed by and acting
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under the Constitution, are no more officers or agents of the
United States than are the members of the State legislatures
when acting as electors of Federal Senators, or the people
when acting as electors of representatives in Congress: hence
the States and the State courts have power to punish fraudulent voting in the choice of their electors. The opinion
is too brief to be satisfactory and does not decide as some
have imagined, that the State courts have exclusive jurisdiction: this point was not necessary for the decision, as recognition of the jurisdiction of the State courts was sufficient. The case was this: Green had been convicted by the
Hustings court of Manchester (Virginia), of voting for Presidential electors while disqualified under the State law; the
United States Circuit Court discharged Green on Habeas
Corps and this discharge was reversed by the Supreme
Court. The case really involved the question of double
punishment, as a Representative in Congress was also voted
for, and the reversal in this respect operated to affirm the propriety of the criminal suffering as much as the different laws
might allow, without deciding the point: (see infra. page 364).
It will be observed that nothing in this utterance of the
Supreme Court touches upon section 5520 of the Revised
Statutes (infra,page 363): in fact, the exact position of Presidential electors urgently needs definition.
IV
The doctrine generally held by the courts, is, that the right
to vote depends on the laws of the State where this franchise
is exercised, and is not granted to a citizen, nor guaranteed
by the Constitution of the United States: per

BOND,

C. J.,

U. S. v. Crfosby et al. (1871), U. S. Circ. Ct., Dist. S. C., I
Hughes 448, 456.
[This was justly denied by Justice
brough case, in this language:-

MILLER,

in the Yar-

But it is not correct to say that the right to vote for a member of Con,gress, does not depend on the Constitution of the United States. The
office, if it be properly called an office, is created by that Constitution,
and by that alone. It also declares how it shall be filled, namely, by election. * * * The States, in prescribing the qualifications of voters for the
most numerous branch of their own legislatures do not do this with
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reference to the election for members of Congress. Nor can they prescribe
the qualification for voters for those [members] eo izomine. They define
who are to vote for the popular branch of their own legislature, and the
Constitution of the United States says the same persons shall vote for
members of Congress in that State. It adopts the qualifications thus
furnished, as the qualifications of its own electors for members of Congress.

It is not true, therefore, that electors for members of Congress owe their
right to vote to the State law in any sense which makes the exercise of
the right to depend exclusively on the law of the State: (iio U. S. 663.)

The Fifteenth Amendment has been construed to confer the
right to vote upon no one, and merely to invest citizens of the
United States with right of exemption from discrimination in
the exercise of the elective franchise, on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude. It is said the right to vote
comes from the States, but the right from the prohibited discrimination comes from the Federal Government. But, unless a citizen is otherwise qualified to vote, he cannot avail
himself of his franchise. Thus, where a State law provides
the qualifications of its voters, and no prohibited discrimination is made, all voters must have those qualifications before
they can insist upon their right to cast their ballots ; they must
be qualified voters before they can have an officer indicted for
refusing their ballot: United States v.Reese (1875), 92 U. S. 214.
Neither the Constitution, nor the Fourteenth Amendment,
made all citizens voters; and a provision in a State Constitution
which confines the right of voting to male citizens of the
United States is no violation of the Federal Constitution, and
an officer refusing the ballot of a woman, violates no law, State
or National, because the woman had no right to the elective
franchise; the new Amendments do not enlarge the privilege
of suffrage so as to entitle anyone to vote: .Minorv.Happersett,
(1874), 21 Wall. (88 U. S.) 162.
[The year previous, one of the concurring Justices in .inorv.
Happersett(HUNT), sitting in the Circuit Court, for the Northern District of New York, and upon an indictment of Miss
Susan B. Anthony, for voting at an election for Representatives
in Congress, under section 5511 of the Revised Statutes directed
a verdict of guilty, sayingThe right of voting, or the privilege of voting, is a right or privilege
arising under the Constitution of the State, and not under the Con-
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stitution of the United States. * * If the right belongs to any particular person, it is because such person is entitled to it by the laws of the State
where he offers to exercise it, and not because of citizenship of the United
States. * * If the Legislature of the State of New York should require a
higher qualification in a voter for a Representative in Congress than is
required of a voter for a member of the House of Assembly of the State,
this would, I conceive, be a violation of a right belonging to a person as a
citizen of the United States. That right is in relation to a Federal subject or interest, and is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution : 14 Blatchf.
205.

As already noticed, the Supreme Court of the United States
bases the right to vote for Congressmen upon the Federal
Constitution, and it has been thought, that if the rules of logic
are rigidly applied to the opinion, the distinction is more
seeming than real.
[This sentiment has sought support from the distinction
drawn by Justice MILLER, in the Yarbrough case, where
the broad language of WAITE, C. J., in M}Iinor v. Happersett
(1874), 21 Wall. (88 U.S.) 162, was restrained to its immediate
subject matter.
But the Court was combatting the argument that this right [to vote] was
conferred on all citizens, and therefore upon women as well as men.
In opposition to that idea, it was said the Constitution adopts as the
qualification for voters of members of Congress that which prevails in the
State where the voting is to be done; therefore, said the opinion, the
right is not definitely conferred on any person or class of persons by the
Constitution alone, because you have to look to the law of the State for
the description of the class. But the Court did not intend to say, that
when the class or the person is thus ascertained, his right vote for a member of Congress was not fundamentally based upon the Constitution, which
created the office of member of Congress, and declared it should be elective, and pointed to the means of ascertaining who should be electors.
The Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution, by its limitation on the
power of the States in the exercise of their right to prescribe the qualifications of voters in their own elections, and by its limitations of the power
of the United States over that subject, clearly shows that the right of
suffrage was considered to be of supreme importance to the National
Government, and was not intended to be left within the exclusive control of the States: Exparle Yarbrough (1883), iTO U. S. 651, 664.
V.

The provisions of the Statutes of the United States which.
are enforceable by the Federal Courts in trials of offenders
against the ballot box, are both general and special, the latter
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relating solely to election offenses. Of the general statutes, the
following are applicable to the subject.
SECTION 5440. If two or more persons conspire either to commit any
offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States in any
manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, all the parties to such conspiracy shallbe
liable to a penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars, or to imprisonment for not more than two years, or to both fine and imprisonment in
the discretion of the Court. (Actof March 2, 1867, Section 3o , 14 Stat. at
Large 484, as amended by Act of May 17, 1879, 21 Stat. at Large 4, and
now incorporated into the Revised Statutes.)

[Under this Statute, in 1887, Coy was successfully indicted
in the Indianapolis ballot box case: 127 U. S. 731 ; 31 Fed.
Repr. 794- It is, of course, a general Statute, not simply applicable to election cases, and has had its most extensive application in revenue cases: See the references in Gould and
Tucker's notes on the Revised Stat. U. S. pp. 1023-6.
CHAP. CXIV. An Act to e;iforce the right of citizens of the United
States to vote in the several States of this Union, andfor otherpurposes.
(Approved May 31, 1870, I6 Stat. at Large 139.)
SEc. 6, as ificorporated in the Revised Statutes : to wit-

SEC. 5508. If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten,
orintimidate any citizen, in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right

or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or because of his having so exercised the same ; or if two or more
persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another,
with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege so secured, they shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than ten years; and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any office, or place of honor, profit or
trust, created by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

[In the next year, by Act of April 20, 187 1, Section second,
(17 Stat. at Large 13), and now incorporated in the Revised
Statutes as Section 5407, punishment was provided for a conspiracy to defeat the due course of justice in cases such as are
forbidden in Section 5508,just quoted.
[This section is constitutional: Baldwin v. Franks (1886),
120 U. S. 678, 690, a Chinese case affirming U. S. v. Waddell
(1884), 112 Id. 76, a homestead entry, affirming EX parte Yarbrougli (1883), 1 io Id. 65 1, a case of intimidation of a colored
voter; but it protects only persons who are "citizens," in a
political sense, as voters. The interpretation put upon it by
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Chief Justice WAITE is as severe as that put by the same Justice upon Sections three and four of the same Act of 1870, in
U. S. v. Reese (1875), 92 U. S. 214; a construction so severe
that the Court was obliged to give an explanation in Supervisors v. Stanley (I881), 105 Id. 305, where the question was one
of taxation and not of civil rights. Justice MILLER, delivering the opinion in the latter case, saidThis Court, in the two cases cited in the brief, United States v. Reese
Trade Mark Cases (ioo Id. 82), concedes the general
principle that the whole of a statute is not necessarily void because a
part of it may be so. * * * The first case also implies that there may
be unconstitutional provisions which do not vitiate the whole statute, or
even a single section, because the argument is to show that in that case
there could be no separation of the good from the bad. It is also to be
observed that, in both these cases, it was a statute creating and punishing offences criminally which was to be construed in regard to the limited constitutional power of Congress in criminal matters.
(92 U. S. 214) and

[The last sentence explains the seeming preference of the
rich tax payer over the poor voter.
[Returning to Baldwin v. Franks, the substance of the decision is contained in the words of Chief Justice WAITE.This section is highly penal in its character, much more so than any
others, for it not only provides as a punishment for the offence, a fine of
not more than five thousand dollars and an imprisonment of not more
than ten years, but it declares that any person convicted; shall "be thereafter ineligible to any office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created by
the Constitution or laws of the United States." It is, therefore, to be
construed strictly ; not so strictly as to defeat the legislative will, but
doubtful words are not to be extended beyond their natural meaning
in the connection in which they are used. Here the doubtful word is
"citizen," and it is used in connection with the rights and privileges pertaining to a man as a citizen, and not as a person only, or an inhabitant.
And, besides, the crime has been classified in the revision [. e., the arrangement of the Revised Statutes of the United States,] among those
which relate to the elective franchise and the civil rights of citizens. For
these reasons we are satisfied that the word "citizen," as used in this
statute, must be given the same meaning it has in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and that, to constitute the offence which is there
provided for, the wrong must be done to one who is a citizen in that sense
* * *, It may be that by this construction of the statute, some are excluded from the protection it affords, who are as much entitled to it as those
who are included; but this is a defect, if it exists, which can be cured by
Congress, but not by the Courts: (120 U. S. 691).

[These last words seem to have allusion to the vigorous
dissent in that case, by Justices HARLAN and FIELD.

TO PUNISH OFFENDERS AGAINST THE BALLOT BOX.

349

Other statutes and authorities on intimidating the voter
appear later: (see page 36o).
VI.

[The statutes especially relating to the suffrage may be
divided into two classes; those relating to lFederal elections,
and those protecting the exercise of the suffrage generally.
Among the former are Section Nineteen of the Act of 1870
(whose title has already been quoted) which is now incorporated in the Revised Statutes as follows SEC. 5511. If, at any election for Representative or Delegate in Congress, any person knowingly personates and votes, or attempts to vote, in
the name of any other person, whether living or dead, or fictitious; or
votes more than once at the same election for any candidate for the same
office; or votes at a place where he may not be lawfully entitled to vote;
or votes without having a lawful right to vote; or does any unlawful act
to secure an opportunity to vote for himself, or any other person ; or by
force, threat, intimidation, bribery, reward, or offer thereof, unlawfully
prevents any qualified voter of any State, or of any Territory, from freely
exercising the right of suffrage, or by such means induces any voter to
refuse to exercise such right, or compels or induces, by any such means,
any officer of an election in any such State or Territory, to receive a vote
from a person not legally qualified or entitled to vote ; or interferes in any
manner with any officer of such election in the discharge of his -duties; or
by any such means, or other unlawful means, induces any officer of any
election, or officer whose duty it is to ascertain, announce or declare the
result of any such election, or give or make any certificate, document or
evidence in relation thereto, to violate or refuse to comply with his duty
or any law regulating the same; or knowingly receives the vote of any
person not entitled to vote, or refuses to receive the vote of any person entitled to vote, or aids, counsels, procures, or advises any
such voter, person or officer to do any act hereby made a crime, or omit
to do any duty, the omission of which is hereby made a crime, or attempt
to do so, he shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred
dollars, or by imprisonment not more than three years, or by both, and
shall pay the costs of prosecution.

[The phrase "officers of any election," is examined later on

page 36o.
[In the Coy case, (supra,) the offence was a conspiracy to induce the election officers to refuse to comply with their duty
in safe-keeping the election returns, and an effort was made to
secure a ruling to the effect that the evil intent, though directed
against the State as well as the Congressional returns, which
were all on one sheet, must nevertheless be shown to have
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been specifically directed against the Congressional vote. This
was denied, after the analogy of the killing of one person for
another, and of the laws relating to gunpowder and similar
dangerous substances. MILLER, J., writing the opinion of the
Court, addedThe object to be attained by these Acts of Congress is to guard against
the danger, and the opportunity, of tampering with the election returns, as
well as against direct and intentional frauds upon the vote for the members of that body. The law is violated whenever the evidences concerning the votes cast for that purpose are exposed, or subjected in the hands
of improper persons, or unauthorized individuals to the opportunity for
their falsification, or to the danger of such changes oiforgeries as may affect
that election, whether they actually do so or not, and whether the purpose
of the party guilty of thus wresting them from their proper custody and
exposing them to such danger, might accomplish this result. In re Coy
(1887), 127 U. S. 731, 754.

[Consequently the ruling of GRESHAM, J., in another case,
would seem to. be too strict, unless there were different tally
sheets, poll books, ballot boxes and returns, for State and
Congressional elections, and no effort to vote for Congressman
as in U. S. v. Seaman (1885), U. S. Circ. Ct., S. Dist. N. Y.,
23 Fed. Repr. 882. The ruling of GRESHAM was as followsThe mere fact thata representative in Congress is voted for at an election
of State and County officers, does not authorize Congress to regulate such
elections in matters which in no wise relate to or affect the result so far as
it concerns the United States. It has no more right to regulate the election of State and County officers, under these circumstances, that it would
have if no representative in Congress were voted for; and it has not attempted to do so.
The jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, in the enforcement of these
statutes, depends altogether upon something having been done, or
omitted, which has affected, or might affect, the result of an election for a
representative in Congress. The facts stated in the affidavit, in connection
with the admissions of counsel in the course of argument, show that the
result of the election was not affected, unless itwas by the mutilation of the
tally papers solely and exclusively in the statements of the vote for coroner
and criminal judge. It is not pretended that the tally papers were mutilated, changed, or forged in any other respect, or that any of the tally
papers, poll books, or ballots, were removed from their proper place of
custody. The alleged offense against the United States consists wholly in
the alteration of the statements of the votes for coroner and criminal
judge, as contained in the tally papers: Explare Perkins (1887), U. S.
Circ. Ct., Dist. Indiana, 29 Fed. Repr. 9oo.

[Perkins had been committed for refusing to be sworn be-
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fore an United States Commissioner, in a proceeding against
others based on the affidavit mentioned by Judge GRESHAM.
Perkins was therefore discharged, but afterwards was indicted
and convicted with others, for obtaining possession of the
tally paper, poll list and certificate, contrary to Section 5 511,
supra. One of the co-defendants, Coy, petitioned for a habeas
corpus, but was denied by Justice HARLAN, sitting in the Circuit Court with GRESHAM, July 16, 1887 (3I Fed. Repr. 794),
and afterwards was again denied by the Supreme Court of the
United States, May 14, 1888 (127 U. S. 731). These separate
decisions were obtained by complaining of different indictments. The ruling of District Judge WOODS, which was reversed in this Perkins case by Circuit Judge GRESHAM, was
thus found to be correct : it was founded on a prior case where
the District Judge BLODGETT had similarly charged the jury:
See 31 Fed. Repr. 912, for the extracts from this charge. This
ruling of GRESHAM agreed with that of TRENT, Dist J., in U
S. v. Cahill(1881), U. S. Circ. Ct., E. Dist. Mo., 9 Fed. Repr.
80.
[In December, 1886 (U S. v. McBosley, U. S. Dist. Ct., Dist.
Indiana, 29 Fed. Repr. 897), Judge WOODS was moved to
quash a number of indictments founded upon Section 5511,
supra,.because the indictments failed to aver any unlawful
ballot or any bribery in relating to a congressional election. In
.
denying the motion the judge saidWhen congressional and local elections are held at the same times, and
places, and mixed ballots are cast, as is the practice in Indiana, it is a
misleading refinement, I think, to say that there are two elections-a
National and a State-held at the same time. It is one election, for the
conduct of which the two sovereignties have a common concern, though
interested in several results (Ex parle Siebold, [1879] 1oo U. S. 371);
and Congress having unquestionably the paramount, and, when it sees fit
to assertit, the exclusive powerto regulatesuch elections, must, in thefirst
instance at least, determine for itself what regulations are necessary or
expedient; and it is not the province of the courts to restrict or annul
any enactment on the subject, unless it be demonstrable that, inno event,
and under no circumstances, the offense defined, and coming within the
letter and spirit of the enactment, could affect the election for representative in Congress.

[What would be an unlawful prevention under this section
came up for decision'in U. S. v. Souders (1871), U. S. Dist. Ct.,
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Dist. N. J., 2 Abb. 456, where a company ofwhite men, including
the defendant, attacked a number of colored voters, waiting at
the place of election, to deposit their ballots for a representative in Congress. This outrage occurred in Camden, N. J., on
the eighth of November, I87o. The defense set up (unsuccessfully) the fact that the voters afterwards did deposit their
ballots and hence there had been a violation of section 5506
of the Revised Statutes relating to intimidation, (section 14 of
the Act of I87o) and not this section. The Court (NIxoN, J.)
followed the principles explained infra,page 372, and after giving a brief history of the Act of 1870, concluded that the manifest object of section 55o6 was to enforce the provisions of the
Fifteeenth Amendment, and of section 5511 to conserve the
freedom and purity of elections for representatives in Congress.
As to the fact that the voters did actually cast their ballots at
a later hour, and the contention that they therefore were not
actually intimidated, the Court saidIt seems to me, as I have already intimated, that such a construction of
the statute is too narrow, and that it defeats the purpose which Congress
had in view in enacting it. This purpose was to protect men in the discharge of their most sacred political privilege. That would be a slight
protection, indeed, which allows bullies and rowdies to surround the ballot
box from the opening to the close of the polls, keeping off all legal voters
by threats, intimidation, or force ; and then to hold the offense is not committed, if by chance the hindered voters should avail themselves of a
casual opportunity, to slip in their ballots when the backs of these
vigilant sentinels are turned: (page 467.)

[The prohibition against bribery has the same general object as that against intimidation: both are designed to prevent
any interference with the free exercise of the right of suffrage.
Hence, it is immaterial that the bribe was not in relation to
the ballot for Representative; and no such averment is necessary in the indictment: because the theory of the law, in agreement with experience, holds a voter, bribed for one purpose,
to be unfitted for the right use of the ballot for every purpose:
U. S. v. MBosley (1886), U. S. Dist. Ct., Dist. Indiana, 29 Fed.
Repr. 897, 899.
[Unlawful voting is not merely forbidden and punished by
section 5511, but an important matter of detail was added in
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the same Act of 187o by Section Twenty-one, now incorporated

with the Revised Statutes asSECTION 5514. Whenever the laws of any State or Territory require
that the name of a candidate or person, to be voted for as Representative
or Delegate in Congress, shall be printed, written, or contained, on any
ticket or ballot, with the names of other candidates or persons to be voted
for at the same election, as State, territorial, municipal, or local officers, it
shall be deemed sufficient pirima facie evidence to convict any person
chargedwith voting or offering, to vote, unlawfully, under the provisions
of this chapler, to prove that the person so charged, cast or offered to cast
suel a ticket or ballot whereon the name of such Representative or Delegate might by lazv be printed, written or contained,or that the person SO
charged.committed any of the offenses denounced in this chapter with
reference to such ticket or ballot.

[The word SO is here printed in capitals to catch the eye,
as the word has no place in the section, according to the ruling of Justice BREWER, while Circuit Judge, in U.S. v. Morissey
(1887), U. S. Circ. Ct., E. Dist. Mo., 32 Fed. Repr. 147. Morrissey was judge of an election where representatives in Congress were voted for as well as State and county officers and
was convicted of receiving ballots from persons known to him
not to be entitled to vote. He moved in arrest of judgment,
that this Section was intended to apply only to the party voting or offering to vote. This was denied, the Court sayingIt is a familiar rule that, that which is within the letter of a statute, and
not within its-spirit, is not within the statute ; and also that, that which is
within thespirit, though not within the letter, may sometimes be declared
to be within the statute, even in Criminal cases. Reading that [section]
as it is expressed, "so charged," it makes that clause superfluous, meaningless, and worse than that, because a person "so charged," could not
be convicted of any offense but that of which he is charged, and could
not be convicted of any of the offenses named in this chapter. Obviously,
that was not the intent of Congress.
Through carelessness in the drafting or compilation of this section, that
word "so" was interpolated improperly, and the only fair construction of
that section is to treat it as though that -word was not there. So read, it
gives force and validity to this clause which otherwise it would not have.
So read, it gives meaning to the whole section, and carries out the
obvious intent of Congress, that, where there is a single ballot at any election at which, under the law of the State, all names must appear on the
same ballot, the production of the ballot is pirimafacieevidence, sufficient
to convict, etc., in the trial of any of the offenses named in this chapter.
I think that objection, therefore, is not well taken.

[The carelessness spoken of will appear by a comparison.
VOL. XXXVIII.-23
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In place of words printed in italics in section 55 14, the Act of1870 used other words, also printed below in italics and added a
clause, after the italics, which the Revised Statutes omit, the
(rig'nal reading,Srciox 21. And be itfirtherenacted, that whenever, by the laws of
any State or Territory, the name of any candidate or person to be voted
for as representative or delegate in Congress, shall be required to be
printed, written, or contained in any ticket or ballot with other candidates
or persons to be voted for at the same election for State, territorial, municipal or local 6fficers, it shall be sufficientprimafacie evidence, eitherfor
the purpose of indicting or convicting any person charged with voting,
or attempting or offering to vote unlawfully, under the provisions of the
preceding sections, orfor committing either of the offenses thereby created
to prove that the person so charged or indicted, voted or attempted or
offered to vote such ballot or ticket, or committed either of the offenses
named in the preceding sections of this Act, with reference to such ballot.
And the proof and establishment of such facts shall be taken, held and
deemed to be presumptive evidence that such person voted, or attempted
or offered to vote, for such representative or delegate, as the case may be,
or that such offense, was committed with reference to the election of such
representative or delegate, and shall be sufficient to warrant his conviction,
unless it shall be shown, that such ballot, when cast, or attempted or
offered to be cast by him, did not contain the name of any candidate for
the office of representative or delegate in the Congress of the United
States, or that such offense was not committed with reference to the election.of such representative or delegate: (16 Stat. at Large 145.)

[The omission of the last words, printed in "roman," now
appears to have been discreet, since the Federal Courts afterwards decided to punish for all offenses against the ballot box,
at an election where a Representative or Delegate in Congress
is voted for: (supra,page 350). But, in other respects, the section, both originally and as incorporated, is merely a rule of
evidence. Hence, Morrissey finally escaped on account of the
absence from his indictments, of the words necessary to charge
him with an act affecting the election of Congressmen. The
Court expressly followed the cases of U. S. v. Cahill (1881),
U. S. Circ. Ct., E. Dist. Mo., 9 Fed. Repr. 8o, and U. S. v. Seaman (1885), U. S. Circ. Ct., S. Dist. N. Y., 23 Id. 882. All
these cases preceded the Coy cases and the ground is now
clear for a final decision that an indictment would be sufficient
if it averred certain forbidden acts at an election where Representatives in Congress were to be balloted for: (supra,
pages 350, 351).
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[While indeed this section 5514 does relate to evidence, the
effect of such a regulation of the proof is to dispense with the
averment in the indictment, that the ballot cast contained the
name of a candidate for Representative in Congress: U. S. v.
jMcBosley (1886), U. S. Dist. Ct., Dist. Indiana, 29 Fed. Repr.
897.
Section Twenty of this Act of 1870 was amended the following year (Act of February 28, 1871, 16 Stat. at Large 433),
by inserting the italicized words, so as to read (in the Revised
Statutes)SIc. 5512. That if, at any registration of voters for an election for representative or delegate in the Congress of the United States, any person
knowingly personates and registers, or attempts to register, in the name
of any other person, whether living, dead, or fictitious, or fraudulently
registers, or fraudulently attempts to register, not having a lawful right so
to do; or does any unlawful act to secure registration for himself or any
other person ; or by force, threat, menace, intimidation, bribery, reward,
or offer, or promise thereof, or other unlawful means, prevents or hinders any person havinga lawfulright to register, from duly exercising such
right; or compels or induces, by any of such means, or other unlawful
means, any officer of registration to admit to registration any person not
legally entitled thereto, or interferes in any manner with any officer of
registration in the discharge of his duties, or by any such means, or other
unlawful means, induces any officer of registration to violate or refuse to
comply with his duty, or any law regulating the same ; orif any such officer knowingly and wiffijly registers as a voter any pers9n not entitled to
be registered,or refuses so to registerany person entitled to be registered;
or if any such officer or other person who has any duty to perform in relation to suck registrationor election, in ascertaining,announcing, or
declaringthe result thereof,or in giving or making any certificate, docuinent, or evidence in relation thereto, knowingly neglects or refuses to
perform any duty requiredby law, or violates any duty imposed by law,
or does any act unauthorizedby law, relating to or affecting such registration, or election, or the result thereof,or any certificate,document, or
evidence in relation thereto, or if any person aids, counsels, procures, or
advises any such voter, person, or officer, to do any act hereby made a
crime or to omit any act, the omission of which is hereby made a crime,
every such person shall be punishable as prescribed in the preceding Section. [i. e. Section 5511.]

[The words in italics took the place of the words "or knowlingly and wilfully receive the vote of any person not entitled
to vote, or refuse to receive the vote of any person entitled to
vote," in the original act.
[This section depends upon the power of Congress to de-
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clare that a fraudulent registration, or a fraudulent attempt to
register, for the purpose of voting for a Representative or Delegate in Congress, is a crime against the United States. It
does not inv6lve the power to ordain a National registration
law, for it does not operate until the State has imposed registration.
[Entertaining no doubt of this power, the Court overruled
the demurrer to the indictment and the defendant was sentenced to two years imprisonment: U. S. v. Quinn (187o), U. S.
Citc. Ct., S. Dist. N. Y., 8 Blatchf. 48, Coram, WOODRUFF and
BLATCHFORD, JJ.

[This ruling of the Court was made with the statute of 1870
before it, and the section construed had a proviso appended
which is now incorporated in the Revised Statutes, asSEc. 5513. Bvery registration made under the laws of any State or
Territory, for any State or other election at which such Representative or
Delegate in Congress may be chosen, shall be deemed to be a registration
within the meaning of the preceding Section, notwithstanding such registration is also made for the purpose of any State, Territorial, or municipal
election.

Under section 5512, the neglect or refusal of an election officer to perform a duty required by law, in regard to an election, at which a Representative of Congress is voted for, is
made an offence against the United States, although such nonperformance of duty is without any evil intent; while the doing of an act simply unauthorized by law is not punishable,
unless done with an intent to affect the election or the result
thereof. Whether such a distinction is justified by sound
public policy was for the law-making department of the
government to determine, and not for the courts: An re Coj,
(1887), U. S. Circ. Ct., Dist. Indiana, 3F Fed. Repr. 794, 797,
per HARLAN, J., who also saidObserve, "intent" is not made an element in determining the existence
of the offences specified in that section, except in those cases where the
offender knowingly does an act" unauthorized" by the law of the United
States, or by the law of the State or Territory under whose sanction he
exercises the functions of an officer of election.

[And the learned Justice proceeded to quote with approval
from the decision of the United States District Judge (HAMMOND) overruling a demurrer to an indictment under this Sec-
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tion, in U. S. v. Jackson (1885), U. S. Circ. Ct., W. Dist. Tenn.,
25 Fed. Repr. 548, interposed on the ground that no specific
intent to violate the law had been charged.
[In this Tennessee case, in addition to that of want of charge
of specific intent, the demurrer also set up the want of any'
penalty in the State laws. This was also held to be no ground
for demurrer, the learned Judge sayingIt is the plain purpose of this statute to declare as an offense against the
United States, profirio vigore, the neglect, refusal, or violation of. any
duty imposed upon an officer holding an election for representative in
Congress, by any law, State or Federal. It is not necessary, as counsel
argue, that the State law imposing the duty shall attach a penalty for its
violation, in order to make it an offense under this statute. The only object for which we look to the State law, is to find the measure of the
officer's duty, as one charged with the function of holding the election.
Once given a duty to perform in that regard, and its performance is an
obligation imposed by this Federal statute. Its non-performance subjects
the officer to the penalties here imposed. Itiswholly immaterial how the
Statute laws may look upon, or treat, a violation of his duty; for when
the duty is assumed by him, he comes immediately within the jurisdiction of the Federal law, and must obey it, or take the consequences here
by this statute itself imposed for any neglect, refusal, or violation of that
duty: 25 Fed. Repr. 549.

[Section. Twenty-two of the Act of 1870 was incorporated
into the Revised Statutes, the last word being changed from
"ten" to "eleven" by the Act of February 18, 1875 (I8 Stat.
at Large 316, 320): to wit-.
SIc. 5515. Uvery officer of an election at which any Representative, or
Delegate, in Congress is voted for, whether such officer of election be appointed, or created, by or under any law or authority of the United States,
or by or under any State, territorial, district, or municipal law or authority, who neglects or refuses to perform any duty in regard to such election,
required of him by any law of the United States, or of any State or Territory thereof; or who violates any dutyso imposed ; orwhoknowinglydoes
any acts thereby unauthorized, with intent to affect any such election, or
the result thereof; or who fraudulently makes any false certificate of the
result of such election in regard to such Representative or Delegate; or
who withholds, conceals, or destroys any certificate of record so required
by law respecting the election of any such Representative or Delegate ; or
who neglects or refuses to make and return such certificate as required by
law; or who aids, counsels, procures, or advises any voter, person orofficer
to do any act by this or any of the preceding sections made a crime, or
to omit to do any duty, the omission of which is by this, or any of such
sections, made a crime, or attempts so to do, shall be punished as prescribed in section fifty-five hundred and eleven. [Sfiera.]
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[This section is constitutional: U. S. v. Gale(1883), 109 U.
S. 65, 66, following the Siebold and Clarke cases (1879), 1oo Id.
37', 399.
[As the question of intention is not an element under section 5512, except when the officer of election knowingly does
an unauthorized act; so under section 5515, there are two
offenses; the one arising from neglect or refusal, and the other
from intention to affect the result of the election: U. S.. v.
Baldidge (1882), U. S. Circ. Ct., N. Dist. Ala., II Fed. Repr.
552. In this case the election officers were charged with
making a false certificate of the result of the election, the evidence showing the certificate was false because the ballot box
had been tampered with by other persons after the close ofthe
election and before the ballots in the box had been counted.
Leaving the ballot box so that it could be tampered with,
was held to be sufficient evidence that the certificate was
fraudulently false, BRUCE, District Judge, charging the jury
thatWhen the officer of election has the means and ability to prevent mischief and fraud, he must do so ; and if, through his carelessness and indifference, the fraud is perpetrated, his negligent conduct, •under such
circumstances, becomes culpable and is what the law calls criminal negligence: Id. 556.

[The same ruling was made in U. S. v. Jackson (1885), U.
S. Circ. Ct., W. Dist. Tenn., 25 Fed. Repr. 548; both cases
proceeding upon the common ground that the specific intent
applies only to the clause in which it is found, and not to the
preceding or following clauses.
[It is true that the jury in U. S. v. Foster(188 I), U. S. Circ.
Ct., E. Dist. Va., 6 Fed. 247, were instructed that the rejection
of ballots offered by those entitled to vote, was only a technical violation of section 5515, and that they should be satisfied
of some wrongful purpose, motive or intention, in such rejection. This case is, therefore, opposed to the distinction drawn
above; it does not carry much weight with it, as it regards the
officer rather than the act.
[Hence a clerk of the election, whose duty it is to attest the
signatures of the judges, and who is not required to know
whether the certificate is correct, cannot be indicted for merely
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attesting: U. S. v. Green (887), U. S. Circ. Ct., E. Dist. Mo.,
33 Fed. Repr. 619; and a joint indictment with the judges of
the election is bad : U. S. v. Davis, Id. 621.
[An illustration of an intentional crime under this section
appears in U. S. v. Bader (1882), U. S. Circ. Ct., E. Dist. La., 4
Woods i89, where the election officers demurred to an indictment charging them with adding names to the registry, without authority of law and with intent to affect an election
at which a Representative in Congress would be voted for.
The demurrer was overruled. Of course the allegation must
be proved: U. S. v. Wright (1883), U. S. Circ. Ct., E. Dist. La.,
16 Fed. Repr. 112.
[Again, in 7f1atter of Spooner (I88o), U. S. Circ. Ct., S. Dist.
N. Y., 9 Abbott's New Ca. 48 1, the Court, composed of BLATCHFORD and CHOATE, were unanimous in the opinion that a deputy
marshal or chief supervisor would be liable for purposely omitting until election day the service of a warrant for illegal
registration, the former Judge sayingWe both agree that where a man can be arrested before election day as
well as not, he ought to be so arrested. If there is any delay in arresting
him where he could have been arrested before that day, it must be presumed to be for the purpose of preventing him from voting, and consequently unlawffl: Id. 483.

In U. S. v. Carttders(1882), U. S. Circ. Ct., N. Dist. Miss., 15
Fed. Repr. 309, there was a motion to quash an indictment
charging the appointment of an inspector who could not read
and write, with the intention of affecting an election where a
Representative in Congress was voted for. The motion was
refused, HILL, J., sayingThe [State election] statute provides, and properly so, that, in any event,
competent and suitable persons shall be appointed to discharge these important trusts, if such persons can be procured, and the presumption is
that every County and election district does contain a sufficient number
of such competent and suitable persons to perform these duties, and that,
if appointed, they will serve. If any county or district should be so unfortunate as not to contain such persons they ought to be abolished and
added to such as do contain them. It is an impossibility for a person,
who can neither read nor write, to properly discharge the duties of an
inspector of such elections ; it is their duty to determine what votes are
proper to be received and counted, and those properly to be rejected; to
ascertain the whole number cast for each candidate and to make and sign
the proper returns.
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(It was under this section 5515, that the Governor of
Arkansas was indicted for issuing a fraudulent certificate of
election. Without entering into the me'rits at all, the United
States District Court (composed of DILLON and Caldwell, JJ.)
sustained a demurrer, on the ground that the Governor of a
State was not an officer of election: U S. v. Clayton (1871), 2
Dillon 219; S. C. IO AiIERICAN LAW REGISTER 737. This
citation in the margin of the Revised Statutes is incorrectly
given "19 Amer. L. Rep. 737," being both a misprint and a
disregard of the numbering of the New Series. The decision
itself proceeded upon two grounds; the popular use of the
words "officers of election", and the danger of disturbing the
political harmony of the Union upon a mere construction of
a statute. The authorities followed are collated (inf-a, page 372).
[The definition of an "officer of an election" was also
entered upon in U. S. v. Fisher(I88 I), U. S. Circ. Ct., S. Dist.
Ohio, 8 Fed. Repr. 414, where a supervisor, appointed under
the laws of the United States, was indicted for stuffing the
ballot box, and demurred on the ground that he was not an
" officer of election." The demurrer'was overruled, after an
examination into the duty of a supervisor.
VII.

[In addition to the general crime of intimidating a citizen
(ante, page 347) there are two classes of statutes relating especially to the ballot. One of these relates to violation of rights
secured in every State and Territory to every voter, by the Fifteenth Amendment. Want of space forbids examination into this
class of intimidations, and requires that attention should be
given solely to the other class of statutes relating to voters for
electors for President or Vice-President, or for Representatives
in Congress.
[In 1883 Munford and others demurred to an information in
the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, charging them with conspiracy to prevent, as well as actually delaying the assessment of certain voters as required to
be done to qualify them to vote. The authority for such information was in the Revised StatutesSec. $5o6.

1 very person who, by any unlawful means, hinders, delays,
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prevents or obstructs, or combines and confederates with others to hinder,
delay, prevent, or obstruct any citizen from doing any act required to be
done to qualify him to vote, or from voting at any election in any State,
territory, district, county, city, parish, township, school district, municipality, or other territorial subdivision, shall be fined not less than five
hundred dollars, or be imprisoned not less than one month nor more than
one year, or be punished by both such fine and imprisonment.

[The margin of the Revised Statutes indicates that this
Section was derived from Section four of the Act of 1870; it
also refers to the cases of U. S. v. Reese (1875), 92 U. S. 214,
and U. S. v. Cruikshank (1875), Id. 542, where Section
four was pronounced unconstitutional.
Of course, the
counsel for Munford raised the constitutional question; the
Court, composed of Judges BOND and HUGHES, denied the
application of these decisions, pointing out that they were
rendered in civil rights cases and not at or connected with
congressional elections, and under Section four of the Act
of 1870, which was connected with the preceding sections
by the words "as aforesaid." - This latter point was especially
dwelt upon by both the judges:The information in this case is founded upon Section 5506 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States; I will remark that that Section is not the same
law as Section four of the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870. It is nearly
the same in terms, but it contains no words connecting it with other sections of any act, as Section four did. It stands upon its own terms and
language. It was not enacted in the same bill as Section four of the Act
of 1870, or at the same time, or by the same Congress. It was enacted in
1874, and took effect as a law on the first of December, 1874, two months
after the case of U. S. v. Reese was argued before the Supreme Court of
the United States, and more than two years after the indictment was
found, which was passed upon in that case. The Supreme Court did not
in the case of Reese, and has not in any subsequent case, passed upon
Section 55o6 of the Revised Statutes; and, whatever it may have ruled in
any of its decisions upon any other statute, such as Section four of the
Enfoicement Act of 1870, 1on constal that it has thereby ruled upon
Section 5506, upon which the information before us is founded.
We are dealing here with an offense charged to have been committed at
a Federal election, in violation of this Section 55o6 ; and the defense ask
us to base our ruling, in this case of a Federal election, upon the ruling of
the Supreme Court in a case arising in a town election, under the Act 9 f
1870, in which that Court not only carefully confined itself to the case before
it, but protested by iteration, that it was not considering any law in its relation to Federal elections: HuGEs, J., U. S. v. MNwford (1883), U. S.
Circ. Ct., E. Dist. Va., 16 Fed. Repr. 223, 229.
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[Munford had still further trouble, as he was sued for refusing to assess one Brown, who wished to qualify himself to
vote for Congressmen. The declaration contained the necessary averments, to bring the case within the Revised StatutesSEC. 2005. When, under the authority of the constitution or laws of
any State, or the laws of any Territory, any act is required to be done as
a prerequisite or qualification for voting, and by such constitution or laws,
persons or officers are charged with the duty of furnishing to citizens an
opportunity to perform such prerequisite, or to become qualified to vote,
every such person and officer shall give to all citizens of the United States,
the same and equal opportunity to perform such prerequisite, and to become qualified to vote.
SEC. 2oo6. Every person or officer, charged with the duty specified in
the preceding Section, who refuses or knowingly omits to give full effect
to that section, shall forfeit the sum of five hundred dollars to the party
aggrieved by such refusal or omission, to be recovered by an action on the
case, with costs, and such allowance for counsel fees as the court may
deem just.

[A demurrer to this declaration was overruled upon the
principles already decided in the criminal case (U. S. v. Hunford), Judge HUGHES addingWe hold that Section 2005 was passed by Congress subsequently to the
Act of May, 1870, as part of the laws of the Revised Statutes relating to
the eleclivefranchise; that it was passed in virtue of the general powers
of Congress over Federal elections; that it is not, necessarily, to be construed in connection with the preamble and context of the Act of May,
1870 ; that it was enacted independently of such context, as it now stands
in the Revised Statutes, on the twentieth of June, 1874; that Congress
must be held to have applied it to Federal elections whether express language was used to that effect or not; that it does not in its present form
and status apply to State elections, because, in respect to them, the section, in order to ne valid under the Fifteenth Amendment, which gives only
limited powers of legislation over State elections, must contain apt
words bringing it within the province of the amendment, which words
are wanting; that the fact that the section is not warranted by the
Fifteenth Amendment does not render it null if it is authorized by Article
one of the Constitution'; and that if the discrimination complained of in
this suit resulted, as alleged, in depriving the plaintiff of the privilege of
voting equally with all others entitled to vote in a Federal election, the
declaration is good.
VIII.

[The scope of this article forbids an examination into the
laws regulating the holding of an election and it will merely be
necessary to refer to the Sections of the Revised Statutes
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(Title XXVI), relating to the appointment of supervisors,
and special deputy marshals, and for holding sessions of the
United States Circuit Courts. The subject will be separately
considered hereafter.
CHAP. XXII. An Act to e;,force the Provisionsof the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution ofthe United States; and for other Pierposes. (Approved April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. at Large 13.)
S C. 2, in part, as incorporated in the Revised Statutes: to witSEC. 5520. If two or more persons, in any State or Territory, conspire
to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully
entitled to vote, from giving his support, or advocacy, in a legal manner,
toward or in favor of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice-President, or as a member of the Congress of the United
States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such
support or advocacy; each of such persons shall be punished by a fine of
not less than five hundred, nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, not less than six months nor more
than six years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

[The constitutionality of this Section was affirmed in U. S.
v. Goldman (1878), (U. S. Circ. Ct., Dist. La.) 3 Woods 187,
the Circuit Judge WOODS, distinguishing the ruling in Minor v.
Happersett(1874), 21 Wall. (88 U. S.) 178, that the Constitution
of the United States conferred the right of suffrage upon no
one, in a manner different from that adopted in the Yarbrough
case by the Supreme Court: (ante, page 347).
But this language refers solely to voters at an election for State officers,
and so far as such elections are concerned, the United States has no voters
of its own.
Now, the question is, has an elector who is qualified by State law to
vote for the most numerous branch of the State Legislature, a right conferred upon him by this clause of the Constitution to vote for members of
"
* * It seems to be clear that the language of the SecCongress? *
tion under consideration could not have been intended merely to give a
basis of representation; that was provided for by other clauses of the
Constitution. If this be so, it must follow that it was intended as a declaration as to who of the people of the States, should have the right to
vote for representatives in Congress. As, therefore, the elector qualified
by State laws, derives his right to vote for members of Congress from the
Constitution of the United States, Congress has the power to protect him
in that right.
An election is not simply the depositing of a ballot in a box. If the elector is forced to vote a certain ballot against his will, it is not an election so
far as he is concerned, and equally so if he is prevented by violence
from voting at all. An election is the expression of the free and untrammeled choice of the electors. There must be a choice, and the ex-
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pression of it, to constitute an election. Under our American Constitution, an election implies a free interchange and comparison of views on
the part of the people who are voters, and finally an independent expression of choice. Any interference with the right of the elector, to make
up his mind how he shall vote, is as much an interference with his right
to vote as if he were prevented from depositing his ballot in the ballot
boxafter he had made up his mind: WOODS, J., Id. 196, 197.

[These sentiments are much the same as those of Judge
NIxoNin the Camden intimidation case (ante page 352), and are
solidly based upon the principles of interpreting election laws
mentioned at the close of this article.
[The subject of electors for President and Vice-President
has already been treated: (ante, page 343).
IX.

The United States government has not provided separate
elections for Congressmen, nor has it interfered with the general laws for the conduct of those elections passed by the
State, but has enacted suitable laws for the punishment of
persons who violate laws at an election where votes are cast
for members of Congress. In doing this, the laws of the
State have been adopted, and provisions have been made for
the punishment of crimes against the ballot box, in the Federal Courts. The power of Congress, under the Constitution
of the United States, to make such provisions as are necessary
to secure the fair and honest conduct of an-election at which a
member of Congress is elected, as well as the preservation,
proper return, and counting of the votes cast thereat, and
whatever is necessary to an honest and fair certification of
such election, cannot now be questioned: In re Coy (1888),
127 U. S. 731.
The State laws which Congress sees no occasion to alter, but which it allows to stand, are, in effect, adopted
by Congress. The duties devolved on the officers of elections,
are duties which they owe to the United States as well as to
the State: Exparte Siebold (1879), 100 U. S. 371, 388.
An objection sometimes made to this doctrine, that the Federal Courts can enforce the State laws as laws of the United
States, is, that if Congress can impose penalties for violation
of State laws, the officer will be made liable to double punishment for delinquency, both at the suit at the State, and at
the suit of the United States.
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To this argument it may be said, that each government
punishes for violation of duty to itself only. Where a person
owes a duty to two sovereigns, he is amenable to both for its
performance, and either may call him to account: BRADLEY,
J., Exparte Siebold (879), 100 U. S. 371, 389. [In this latter
case, the learned Justice reviews the cases already decided;
that is, the counterfeiter's case of Fox v. The State of Ohio
(1847), 5 How. (46 U. S.) 410, where State laws against circulating counterfeit coin were held not to be repugnant to the
Federal laws against counterfeiting, Justice MCLEAN dissenting, among reasons, on account of the possible double
punishment; it seems (page 44o of the report), that Justice
STORY (who had died September io, 1845) held the same opinion. At the time of the decision, the Court was composed
of

TANEY,

SON, GRIER

J., and McLEAN, WAYNE, CATRON, DANIEL, NELand WOODBURY, JJ. Three years later, the same

C.

judges went a step further, Justice
Court-

DANIEL

saying for the

With the view of avoiding conflict between the State and Federal jurisdictions, this Court, in the case of Fox v. The State of Ohio, have taken
care to point out, that the same act might, as to its character and tendencies, and the consequences it involved, constitute an offense against both

the State and Federal governments, and might draw to its commission the
penalties denounced by either, as appropriate to its character in reference
to each. We think this distinction sound, as we hold to be the entire doctrines laid down in the case above mentioned, and regard them as being in
no wise in conflict with the conclusions adopted in the present case: U.
S. v. i.Marigold (x85o), 9 How. (50 U. S.) 56o, 569.

[And the Court proceeded to instruct the Circuit Court of
the Northern District of New York, that the United States
could punish for bringing counterfeit coins into the country
and fraudulently circulating them. The Fugitive Slave law,
however, brought the doctrine again into Court, where it was
affirmed by nearly the same judges, WOODBURY having succeeded to CURTIS: Afoorev. Illinois (1852), 14 How. (55U. S-)
13, MCLEAN dissenting on the sole ground of double punishment.
[In "Colemanv. Tennessee (1878), 97 U. S. 509, the principle
objected to was invoked in behalf of the State, to try, convict,
and punish a murderer, who had already been tried and con-
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victed for the same murder, by a court martial. The crime
had been committed March 7, 1865, by a soldier, who thereby
became punishable under the act of Congress of March 3, 1863,
12 Stat. at Large 736. For some reason, the sentence of the
court martial had not been executed, and the criminal was
convicted in the State Court in 1874. The Supreme Court of
the United States held that the criminal was still within the
power of the court martial and directed his delivery to the
military authorities to be dealt with as required by law. This
was upon the express ground that the doctrine did not apply,
because the criminal was a soldier serving in a State, whose
regular government was, at the time, superseded (p. 519).
Justice CLIFFORD dissented, among others, for the express
reason that the punishment in one sovereignty is no bar to
punishment in the other (pp. 537-9); and he repeated his
dissent in Tennessee v. Davis (1879), IOO U. S. 257, 277, where
the Court denied to the State Court the right to try an officer
of the United States for an homicide committed in the discharge of his duty. This has very recently been affirmed in
Neagle's case, and was designed and operates only to shield
Federal officers in the performance of their duty: See annotation to Hatter of David Neagle, 28 AMERICAN LAw REGISTER
624. If Congress commands a State official, over whom they
can have no control, the command is void: Comm. of Ky.
v. Dennison (186o), 24 How. (65 U. S.) 66, but simply on the
ground of want of power, not of clashing authority.
The people of the United States, resident within any State, are subject
to two governments: one State, and the other National; but there need
be no conflict between the two. The powers which one possesses the
other does not. They are established for different purposes, and have
separate jurisdictions. Together, they make one whole, and furnish the
people of the United States with a complete government, ample for the
protection of all their rights at home and abroad. True, it may sometimes
happen that a person is amenable to both jurisdictions for one and the
same act. * * * This does not, however, necessarily imply that two
governments possess powers in common, or bring them into conflict with
each other. It is, the natural consequence of a citizenship which owes
allegiance to two sovereignties, and claims protection from both. The
citizen cannot complain, because he has voluntarily submitted himself to
such a form of government. He owes allegiance to the twodepartments,
so to speak, and within their respective spheres must pay the penalties
which each exacts for disobedience to its laws. In return, he can de-
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mand protection from each within its own jurisdiction : WAITE, C. J.,
U. S. v. Cruikshank (1875), 92 U. S. 543, 550.

[This last case was an indictment for conspiracy, under the
Enforcement Act of 1870 (i6 Stat. at Large 140). The indictment was held insufficient because not stating sufficient
particulars to establish that the unlawful combination was to
prevent the enjoyment of a right secured by the Constitution,
all rights not being secured thereby.
The doctrine that the State and the National Government
are co-ordinate and altogether equal, is only partially true.
Whilst the States are sovereign as to all matters which have
not been granted to the jurisdiction and control of the United
States, the Federal Constitution and the constitutional laws
thereunder, are the supreme law of the land, and when they
conflict with the laws of the States, they are of paramount
authority and obligation.
This is the fundamental principle on which the authority of the Constitution is based ; and unless it be conceded in practice, as well as theory,
the fabric of our institutions, as it was contemplated by its founders, cannot
stand: BRADLFY, J., Exiarle Siebold (1879), 100 U. S. 371, 399.

[At the same time, the care exercised in all such cases in
Federal Courts is not merely technical, and does not alone
spring from the principles of interpretation of Federal criminal statutes ; but rather becauseIt goes without saying, in our dual system of government, that the
Federal government cannot take charge of a mere State election, or an
election merely for State officers, and no matter what wrongs may be
perpetrated in such election, they are beyond the cognizance of the Fedcral courts. The States, and the States alone, can punish offenses which
are merely offenses against the State laws: BREWER, J., in U. S. v.
Mlorrissey, (1887) U. S. Circ. Ct., R. Dist. Mo., 32 Fed. Repr. 147, 150.
X.

[The doctrine that Congress could enforce State election
laws with the same effect as statutes of the United States, was
declared to be constitutional in the cases of Siebold and
Clarke, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in
October Term, 1879, and reported in 100 U. S. 371, 399. In
each case, the opinion was delivered by Justice BRADLEY, with
the concurrence of Chief Justice WAITE, and Justices MIL-
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LER, STRONG,

HUNT, SWAYNE and HARLAN.

Justices

FIELD

and CLIFFORD dissented.
[An interesting application of this principle appears in the

summary of the evidence given in the charge of the District
Judge JACKSON, in U. S. v. Carpenter, U. S. Cir. Ct., Dist.
Tenn., December 3, 1889, 41 Fed. Repr. 330: the returns

showed 43 Republican ballots, while the evidence established
that io9 Republican voters had deposited their ballots. Still
more interesting is U S. v. Badinelli,U. S. Circ. Ct., IV. Dist.
Tenn., December 20, i888, 37 Fed. Repr. 138, where the election officers were indicted fcr excluding an elector from
witnessing the count as allowed by the State Statutes, but
escaped by proving that the manner of making the count was
not legal under the State Statute, and hence no violation of
the Federal law.
[The doctrine was amplified in I888, (fit re COJ', 127 U. S.
731; 753) so as to include the enforcement of State election laws by the United States Courts, not only for violation
of those laws in respect to the ballots cast for Representatives
in Congress, but also to those for State officers, so to prevent
any tampering with any ballots at any election where Representatives in Congress are voted for. The decision was by
Justice MILLER, with the concurrence of Justices BRADLEY,
HARLAN, MATTHEWS, GRAY, BLATCHFORD and LATMAR; Justice

FIELD dissented, and Chief Justice WAITE had died before
the entry of the final judgment.
[The application of this principle resulted in a conviction
for entering upon the book of registration of voters (under
the Missouri Statute of 1883, Laws, p. 38), the names of
persons who did not apply for registration or take any oath,
such as the law requires: U. S. v. alloy, April 20, 1887, U.
S. Circ. Ct., E. Dist. Mo., 31 Fed. Repr. i9; U. S. v. O'Connor,
June 3, 1887, Id. 449.

[In the Clarke case, Justices FIELD and CLIFFORD dissented

on the groundFirst, that it is not competent for Congress to punish a State officer for
the manner in which he discharges duties imposed upon him by the laws
of the State, or to subject him in the performance of such duties, to the
supervision and control of others, and punish him for resisting their interference; and,-
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Second, that it is not competent for Congress to make the exercise of
its punitive power dependent upon the legislation of the States.

Clarke had been convicted in the United States Circuit Court
for the Southern District of Ohio, under Section 5515 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States (ante, page 357) for a
violation as an officer of the election, of the law of the State of
Ohio, regulating an election at which a Representative in
Congress was voted for, in not conveying the ballot box, to
the county clerk, after it had been sealed up and delivered to
him for that purpose, and for allowing, it to be broken open.
[Siebold and others were judges of an election at which
Representatives in Congress were voted for in the City of
Baltimore, on the fifth of November, 1878, and they were convicted in the United States Circuit Court for the District of
Maryland, under the same Section 5515 and also Section 5522
of the Revised Statutes of the United States, for stuffing the
ballot boxes and preventing the United States Supervisors
from performing their duties. The general propositions of
the counsel for the prisoners were all denied, though not
going so far as the two propositions of the dissenting justices;
they werei. That the power to make regulations as to the times, places and
manner of holding elections for Represehtatives in Congress, granted to
Congress by the Constitution, is an exclusive power when exercised by
Congress.
2. That this power, when so exercised, being exclusive of all interference therein by the States, must be so exercised as not to interfere with,
or come in collision with, regulations presented in that behalf by the
States, unless it provides for the complete control over the whole subject
over which it is exercised.
3. That, when put'in operation by Congress, it must take the place of
all State regulations of the subject regulated, which subject must be
entirely and completely controlled and provided for by Congress.

To this the Court, speaking by Justice

BRADLEY,

said-

We are unable to see why it necessarily follows that, if Congress makes
any regulations on the subject, it must assume exclusive control of the
whole subject. The Constitution does not say so: (ioo U. S. 383.)

Coy was convicted in the United States Circuit Court for
the District of Indiana, of conspiring to interfere with the
officers of an election at which Representatives in Congre s
VOT.. XXXVITITT,-24.
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were voted for; that the conspirators did by unlawful meins,
induce the officers to violate and refuse to comply with their
duty in regard to the custody and safe keeping of the election
returns; and that they persuaded and induced theqe officers,
or attempted so to do, to omit their duty in regard thereto.
The indictment was attacked by the defense because it contained no averment that the intent and purpose of the prisoner's
conduct was to affect in any manner the election of a member
of Congress, or to influence the returns relating to that office.
It was argued that since there were many State and locil
officers also voted for at the same election, and in those precincts, and as it was consistent with the indictment that the
actions of the conspirators were directed only to the election
of those persons, and not to that for federal office,-of a Congressional Representative-the indictment was for that reason
insufficient.
It was held, that an indictment in the courts of the United
States, for conspiracy to induce these inspectors to omit their
legal duty, so that the papers specified might come to the
hands of persons who changed and falsified the returns, it was
not necessary to aver or to prove the intention of the wrongdoers or conspirators to affect or change the returns as to the
election of the Congressman who was voted for at the same
time, and the returns of such votes in the same poll-books,
tally sheets and certificates, with those of the State officer.
The general principle was declared, that Congress has full power
to protect these books and other documents from danger of
falsification, even though the conspirators hat no intention of
tampering with the returns of the poll-books and certificates
of the ballots for the member of Congress, but on the contrary, had in view the falsifying the returns of the State officers
only.
The defense argued that since the evil intent was not shown
-to have been specifically aimed at the returns of the vote for
Congressman, the statutes of the United States could have no
force so far as the infliction of any penalty is concerned; that
Congress had no power to provide for any punishment where
no intent affecting the Congressional election was averred.
This the Court denied: saying-
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It would be a very singular principle to establish, that, where a man
was charged with a homicide, caused by maliciously shooting into a crowd
with the purpose of killing some person against whom he bore malice,
but with no intent to injure or kill the individual who was actually struck
by the shot, he should be held excused because he did not intend to kill
that particular person, and had no malice against him:

-KTILLER, J., 127

U. S. 753.

[In this Coy case, Justice FIELD dissented from the extension of the general principle to the entire election. After
alluding to the fact mentioned in Siebold's case (ioo U. S.
393) by Justice BRADLEY, that convenience has induced the
States to elect county and State officers at the same time as
Representatives in Congress, Justice FIELD proceeded thus in
his dissentAccording to the present decision, a conspiracy to persuade the officers
of election to omit any duty imposed upon them under the laws of the
State, though designed merely to affect the election of an inferior magistrate of a village, is an offence against the United States, punishable in
the Federal Courts. Thus, obedience to the laws of the State, in matters
of even local offices, if a member of Congress is voted for at the same
election, may be enforced by the courts of the United States, instead of
by the proper tribunals of the State whose laws have been violated. I am
not able to assent to a doctrine which leads to this result, and gives the
Federal courts power to intermeddle with the action of State officials in
an election for local offices, whenever a member of Congress may have
been voted for, at the same time. I agree to what is said by the Court, as
to the temptations existing in a republican government, where political
power is reposed in representatives of the entire body of the people,
chosen at short intervals by popular elections, to control those elections
by violence and corruption. But I do not perceive in that fact any reason
why the punishment of fraud, committed or designed, at State elections,
for State officers, should be transferred to the Federal courts: (127 U. S.
763.)
XI.

When a persopi is offering to vote, there is no law, State or
National, authorizing his arrest, for any cause relating to his
right of suffrage. But if he votes fraudulently, or falsely
swears when put upon oath, he may be arrested afterwards at
another time and place, and if found guilty, may be punished.
At the polls, claiming and offering to vote, his right to be
there for the purpose of voting is sacred, and his person inviolable: U. S. v. Small (1889), U. S. Circ. Ct., E. Dist. Va., 38
Fed. Repr. 103.
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[This was an indictment of the judge of an election for unlawfully preventing a qualified voter from exercising his right
of suffrage for Representative in Congress. The charge of
the District Judge (HUGHES) is an interesting exposition of the
right of the voter to approach the polls "free from all fear for
his liberty and safety."
XII.
It is doubtful whether the rule, that penal statutes are to be
construed strictly, has any application to the State and Federal laws regulating elections, as they merely regulate the conduct of general elections in the States and define the duties of
the officers of elections. If these statutes, relating to the
election of Representatives in Congress, taken as a whole,
should be interpreted as penal, and strictly (and not remedial
and to be liberally construed, in order to suppress the frauds and
public wrongs against the ballot box), still the inquiry remains
as to the intent with which the legislative department enacted these laws. The-kindred rule must not be disregarded,
that the intention of the lawmaker as gathered from the words
employed, must govern the construction of all statutes: In re
Coy (1887), U. S. Circ. Ct., Dist. Indiana, 31 Fed. Repr. 794;
Taylor v. U. S. (1845), 3 How. (44 U. S.) 310; U. S. v. Hartwell (1868), 6 Wall. (73 U. S.) 385; that penal laws must not
be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the
legislature, and the words of the statute narrowed to the exclusion of cases which these words in the ordinary acceptation
or in that sense in which the legislature had obviously used
them, would comprehend: U S. v. Wiltberger (I820), 5 Wheat.
(18 U. S.) 76, 95 ; that the evident intention of the legislature
ought not to be defeated by a forced and overstrict construction: U S. v. kforzs (184o), 14 Pet. (39 U. S.) 464; Amer.
Fur. CO. v. U. S. (1829), 2 Pet. (27 U. S.) 358, 367.
[In this connection, reference should be made to section
5520 and its exposition (supra, page 363), where conspiracy to
prevent voting is the subject matter.
[Hence, Justice BREWER construed the word "so" out of the
concluding clause of section 5514: supra,page 353 ; and Judges
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and CALDWELL construed " officer of election," not to
include the Governor of a State: (supra, page 36o.)
DILLON

XIII.

[There are some rules which may be -formulated from the
special dangers to the ballot, as shown in the following paragraphs.
[In construing those sections of the Revised Statutes which
have their origin in Act of Congress whose language has been
varied in the revision, care should be taken to observe the
principle of interpretation applied in the Munford cases (supra,
page 361), where this variation in language was observed in
passing upon the constitutionality of sections 2005, 2006 and
5506 of the Revised Statutes.
[In the same direction as the thought expressed by Judge
WOODRUFF (ante, page 342), but more generally, upon the
Eighteenth clause of Section 8 of the Constitution, the language of Justice MILLER may be observed:
That a government whose essential character is republican, whose executive head and legislative body are both elective, whose most numerous
and powerful branch of the legislature is elected by the people directly,
has no power, by appropriate laws, to secure this election from the influence of violence, of corruption and of fraud, is a proposition so startling
as to arrest attention and demand the greatest consideration.
If this government is anything more than a mere aggregation of delegated agents of other States and governments, each of which is superior
to the general government, it must have the power to protect the elections
oih which its existence depends, from violence and corruption.
If it has not this power, it is left helpless before the two great natural
and historical enemies of all republics,-open violence and insidious corruption.
The proposition that it has no such power, is supported by the old argument, often heard, often repeated, and in this Court, never assented to,
that when a question of the power of Congress arises, the advocate of the
power must be able to place his finger on the words which expressly grant
it. The brief of counsel before us, though directed to the authority of
that body to pass criminal laws, uses the same language. Because there
is no express power to provide for preventing violence exercised on the
voter as a means ofcontrolling his vote, no such law can be enacted. It
destroys, at one blow, in construing the Constitution of the United States,
the doctrine universally applied to all instruments of writing, that whatis
implied is as much a part of the instrument as what is expressed.
This principle, in its application to the Constitution of the United
States, more than to almost any other writing, is a necessity, by reason of
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the inherent inability to put into words all derivative powers-a difficulty
which the instrument itself recognizes by conferring on Congress the
authority to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution
the powers expressly granted, and all other powers vested in the government, or any branch of it, by the Constitution ; Article I, sec. 8, clause Is:
Explarle Yarbrough (1883), Iio U. S. 657, 658.

It was held in this case that Congress can by law protect the
act of voting, the place where it is done, and the man who
votes, from personal violence or intimidation, and the Congressional election itself from corruption and fraud. That it
is the duty of the government to see that the votes by which
the members of Congress and its President are elected, shall
be the free vote of the electors, and the officers thus chosen
the free uncorrupted choice of those who have the right to
take part in that choice.
[While Congress has this power to enact appropriate legislation, the Court will not sustain that which amounts to a net
large enough to catch all possible offenders by deciding who
are rightfully detained and who are to be set at large; otherwise Congress would encroach upon the powers reserved to
the people and the States: U. S. v. Reese (1876), 92 U. S.
214. This case was decided by a divided Court, Chief Justice
WAITE writing the opinion with the concurrence of Justices
SWAYNE, MILLER, DAVIS, FIELD, STRONG and BRADLEY. Justice
HUNT dissented on the ground that the statute (of May 31,
1870, 16 Stat. at Large 14o) should be construed according
to the plain intent of Congress, and not so extensively as to
include that which Congress could not meddle with; that is,
a general violation of the rights of an elector at a State election,
which was the case in hand, no candidate for Congress being
voted for. Justice CLIFFORD, agreed with tbejudgment but upon
totally different grounds, chiefly technical; Justice MILLER
distinguished this judgment of the Court in the Yarbrough
case: (Supra,pages 346, 348.) From this principle of interpretation, Justice FIELD also dissented in the Chinese case of
Baldwin v. Franks (.1887), 120 U. S. 678. Justice MILLER
repeated the principle in the Trade Mark Cases of U. S. v.
Steffens, et a. (1879), 10 U. S. 82, only to practically recede,
so far as laws relating to Congressional elections, in the tax
case (stpra,page 348). This principle is, therefore, not likely
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to be applicable to any statute relating to Federal elections,
which has been at all carefully drafted.
XIV.

The contest for a seat in the House of Representatives is a
proceeding unknown to State legislation and the State judicatories; and violations of the law of Congress regulating
it ae offenses against the United States, and not against the
State. Of such contests, the Federal Courts have exclusive
jurisdiction: Ex parte Dock Bridges (I875), U. S. Circ. Ct.,
N. Dist. Ga., 2 Wood, 428. So, when an accused is charged
before a State Court with perjury in having testified falsely
before a notary public in a Congressional election case under
the Revised Statutes, Title 2, Chapter 8, regulating the taking
of testimony, he must be discharged, because such an offense
is cognizable only to the Federal Courts under Section 5392,
providing for the punishment of perjury in any case in which
the' laws of the United States authorize an oath to be administered, and the second section of the Judiciary Act of August
I 3th, 1888, 25 Stat. at Large 434, giving the United States
Courts exclusive cognizance of all crimes cognizable under
the authority of the United States. A notary public is a State
officer, having power to administer any oath required by State
law, and no other. He has no power to administer oaths
required by Congress, unless he is expressly authorized to do
so by Act of Congress, in doing which he acts as an officer of
the United States, and not as an officer of the State; perjury
committed before any officer in a contested Congressional
election case is amenable to punishment under the United
States law: ln re Loney (1889), U. S. Circ. Ct., E. Dist. Va.,
38 Fed. Repr. IOI. The United States Supreme Court affirmed
this judgment, as the testimony in a congressional contested
election case is given in obedience to the laws of the United
States and not of the State, and the accused should have been
tried before the Federal Court, and not before the State Court.
D. H. PINGREY.
Bloomington, M11.

